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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
David Arthur appeals from the district court's orders revoking his probation and
executing his original sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, and from the district
court's order denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion seeking a
reduction of his sentence following revocation. As a threshold matter, he asserts that
the waiver of his appellate rights that was contained in his original plea agreement does
not extend to the subsequent probation revocation proceedings in his case, and
therefore his appeal is properly justiciable by this Court.

He further asserts that,

because his single probation violation was not willful, the district court abused its
discretion when it revoked his probation and executed his original sentence without first
considering whether there were adequate alternatives to revocation of his probation that
would be adequate to address this violation. Finally, Mr. Arthur asserts that the district
court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction of his
sentence following the revocation of his probation because the district court failed to
recognize its discretion to adjudicate the merits of his motion.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
David Arthur pleaded guilty pursuant to a binding Idaho Criminal Rule 11 plea
agreement to one count of felony driving under the influence. (3/17/09 Tr.1, p.3, L.21 p.17, L.7; R., pp.49-51.) One of the terms of this agreement was the following:

1

Because there are multiple volumes of transcripts of proceedings in this case, for ease
of reference, citations made to the transcript are made herein in accordance with the
date of the proceeding transcribed.
1

As part of the plea agreement, Defendant hereby waives any appeals that
may lawfully be waived, including, but not limited to, any appeal pursuant
to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 and any appeal for post-conviction relief.
(R., p.51.)
However, during the change of plea hearing, the district court clarified the
parameters of this waiver as being limited to a waiver of appeals from the district court's
original sentencing determination, from any Rule 35 motions made from the original
sentencing, or from a post-conviction action.

(3/17/09 Tr., p.4, Ls.20-23.) This plea

agreement called for Mr. Arthur to be placed on probation for a period of four years.
(R., p.50.)
Thereafter, the district court sentenced Mr. Arthur to 10 years, with five years
fixed, and placed him on probation for four years. (5/28/09 Tr., p.12, Ls.3-20; R., pp.6167.) Prior to the expiration of this period of probation, an agent's warrant was issued
against Mr. Arthur on the basis of alleged violations of the terms and conditions of his
probation. (R., pp.72-73.) The State's Petition for Probation Violation ultimately alleged
that Mr. Arthur had violated the terms and conditions of his probation by consuming
alcohol and changing his residence without prior approval from his probation officer.
(R., pp.76-80.) The State also appended an admission from Mr. Arthur that he had
consumed alcohol on two occasions. (R., p.81.)
Mr. Arthur ultimately admitted to consuming alcohol, and the State dismissed the
allegation that he had violated his probation by changing his residence without prior
approval.

(7/23/10 Tr., p.2, L.6 - p.5, L.3.)

At the disposition hearing, the State

recommended reinstating Mr. Arthur on probation so long as he successfully completed
therapeutic programming from the New Life Program. (8/30/10 Tr., p.19, L.2 - p.20,
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L.4.) The district court entered an order reflecting these amended probation terms. (R.,
p.93.)
The State then filed a second petition for probation violations. (R., pp.100-106.)
This petition alleged that Mr. Arthur had violated the amended terms and conditions of
his probation by failing to complete the New Life Program as ordered by the district
court due to disciplinary sanctions and by refusing to submit to alcohol or controlled
substance testing at the request of his probation officer. (R., pp.102-103.) The State
also submitted a termination summary that discussed the reasons for Mr. Arthur's
termination from the New Life Program. (R., p.106.)
Mr. Arthur admitted to having violated his probation by failing to complete the
New Life Program, and the State dismissed the remaining allegation that he had
refused to comply with a request to submit to testing for alcohol or controlled
substances. (10/13/10 Tr., p.3, L.24 - p.8, L.7.)
The district court revoked Mr. Arthur's probation and executed his original
sentence of 10 years, with five years fixed, without any reduction. (11/22/10 Tr., p.41,
L.22 - p.42, L.18; R., pp.120-121.) During the probation violation disposition hearing,
the district court twice addressed Mr. Arthur's right to appeal from the court's
determination to revoke his probation and execute his original sentence.

First, the

district court told Mr. Arthur that he had a right to appeal from this disposition. (11/22/10
Tr., p.42, Ls.9-14.)

Second, the district court confirmed thereafter that Mr. Arthur

understood that he had a right to appeal from this disposition order. (11/22/10 Tr., p.42,
Ls.16-18.)
Thereafter, Mr. Arthur filed a Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction of his sentence.
(R., pp.115-119.) He also provided the district court with a statement in support of his
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request for a reduction of his underlying sentence.

(R., p.118.)

In this statement,

Mr. Arthur explained to the district court that his inability to provide a urine sample for
alcohol testing while in the New Life Program was attributable to a condition that he
referred to as a "shy bladder." (R., p.118.)
Additionally, IVlr. Arthur noted his mother's and sister's deteriorating health - both
apparently had issues with strokes and seizures.

(R., p.118.) In light of the serious

medical conditions that his family members suffered, Mr. Arthur requested a reduction
of his fixed time in order to be able to care for his mother and sister.

(R., p.118.)

Finally, Mr. Arthur noted issues regarding prison overcrowding in support of his Rule 35
motion. (R., p.118.)
The district court denied Mr. Arthur's Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.129-130.) In doing
so, the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits of this
motion in light of the Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522 (Ct.
App. 1994).

(R., pp.129-130.)

Therefore, the court denied this motion without

considering the merits of Mr. Arthur's request for leniency.
Mr. Arthur timely appeals from the district court's order revoking his probation
and executing his original sentence, as well as from the denial of his Rule 35 motion.
( R., p. 122.)

4

ISSUES

1.

Was Mr. Arthur's right to appeal from the district court's disposition of his
probation revocation proceedings and subsequent timely filed Rule 35 motion
waived by Mr. Arthur's original plea agreement?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Arthur's probation
without first considering whether this violation was willful and whether alternative
means would be adequate to address the violation?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Arthur's timely Rule 35
motion seeking a reduction of his sentence following the revocation of his
probation because the district court failed to recognize its discretion to entertain
the merits of this motion?

5

ARGUMENT
I.

Mr. Arthur's Right To Appeal From The District Court's Disposition Of His Probation
Revocation Proceedings And Subsequent Timely Filed Rule 35 Motion Were Not
Waived By Mr. Arthur's Original Plea Agreement
As an initial matter, Mr. Arthur submits that the prospective waiver of his
appellate rights that was a part of his original plea agreement did not encompass a
waiver of the right to appeal from subsequent probation revocation proceedings.
Moreover, to the extent that there is any ambiguity regarding the scope of any appellate
waiver in this case, that ambiguity must be construed against the State and in
Mr. Arthur's favor.
Plea agreements, being contractual in nature, are generally interpreted by this
Court in accordance with contract law principles. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 143 Idaho
267, 270 (Ct. App. 2006). This includes review for whether the terms of the contract are
ambiguous. When the language in a plea agreement is ambiguous, this Court will hold
any ambiguity against the State and in favor of the defendant. State v. Peterson, 148
Idaho 593, 595 (2010). As held by the Peterson Court:
Ambiguities in a plea agreement are to be interpreted in favor of the
defendant. "As with other contracts, provisions of plea agreements are
occasionally ambiguous; the government 'ordinarily must bear
responsibility for any lack of clarity."' "[A]mbiguities are construed in favor
of the defendant. Focusing on the defendant's reasonable understanding
also reflects the proper constitutional focus on what induced the defendant
to plead guilty."

Id. at 596 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in the original). "When interpreting a
term of a contract, this Court is obligated to view the entire agreement as a whole to
discern the parties' intentions." Henderson v. Henderson Investment Properties, 148
Idaho 638, 640 (2010).
6

"Guilty pleas have been carefully scrutinized to determine whether the accused
knew and understood all the rights to which he would be entitled at trial, and that he
intentionally chose to forego them."

Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 237

(1973). While a party may prospectively waive rights on appeal, such a waiver must be,
"an intentional relinquishment of a known right," - which has been held to require that
the waiver be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See McCarthy v. U.S., 394 U.S. 459,
466 (1969).

Any waiver contained within a plea agreement that cannot meet this

standard violates due process and will be held void. Id.
Finally, where the plain language of the plea agreement does not appear to
encompass or contemplate proceedings beyond the initial sentencing hearing, terms
contained within the plea agreement will generally not be deemed to carry over to those
subsequent proceedings.

See, e.g., State v. Longest, 149 Idaho 782, 785 (2010).

Revocation of probation, although subject to substantial due process protection, has
been deemed not to be part of a criminal prosecution. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 781 (1973).
In this case, Mr. Arthur entered a plea agreement early on that, "[a]s a part of the
plea agreement, Defendant hereby expressly waives any appeals that may be lawfully
waived, including, but not limited to, any appeal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 and
any appeal for Post Conviction Relief." (R., p.51.) However, in clarifying the scope of
this waiver, the district court in this case noted that this term constituted only a, "waiver
of appeals challenging the sentence, if the Court goes along with it, bringing a Rule 35,
or appealing that issue with relation to post-conviction." (3/17/09 Tr., p.4, Ls.20-23.)
Each instance of the waiver identified by the court was tacked specifically to the district
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court's initial sentencing determination, and did not extend beyond the sentencing stage
to subsequent probation proceedings that might occur years into the future.
Additionally, the understanding of all of the parties that Mr. Arthur's waiver did not
extend to probation revocation proceedings is reflected in the district court's advisories
to him upon revoking his probation. Not only did the district court directly inform him
that he had the right to appeal from this order, but the court took the additional step of
confirming that Mr. Arthur understood that he had this right to appeal. (11/22/10 Tr.,
p.42, Ls.7-18.)
By its terms, the waiver of the right to appeal contained in Mr. Arthur's original
plea agreement does not contain any language that indicated this waiver would extend
to probation revocation proceedings. The record of the statements made indicating the
understanding of the parties regarding this waiver likewise demonstrates that no waiver
of appellate rights regarding probation revocation proceedings was contemplated.
Given that the parties did not appear to contemplate the application of this waiver to
separate and subsequent probation revocation proceedings, there could not have been
a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary prospective waiver of these appellate rights.
This conclusion is particularly strengthened in light of the fact that probation
revocation proceedings are not a part of the underlying criminal action. Therefore, the
probation revocation disposition that Mr. Arthur is appealing from in this case was a
separate proceeding than the underling criminal action out of which this waiver arose.
Finally, even if this Court were to find that the appellate waiver in this case was
ambiguous as to whether Mr. Arthur's right to appeal from probation revocation
proceedings was waived, that ambiguity must be strictly construed against the State
and in Mr. Arthur's favor.
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II.

The District Court Abuse Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Arthur's Probation Without
First Considering Whether This Violation Was Willful And Whether Alternative Means
Would Be Adequate To Address The Violation
The single probation violation upon which Mr. Arthur's probation was revoked
was his discharge from the New Life Program at the Lighthouse Rescue Mission.
(10/13/10 Tr., p.3, L.24 - p.8, L.7; R., pp.102-106.) According to the discharge sheet
from the New Life Program, Mr. Arthur's discharge was attributable to his inability termed a "passive refusal" - to provide a urine sample on command in order to submit
this sample for testing for alcohol or controlled substances. This form also indicated
that Mr. Arthur had made a couple of unauthorized phone calls and "objected to
religious aspects of the program."

(R., p.106.)

However, the facts revealed at the

disposition hearing on this violation revealed that the facts that led to his discharge were
not the result of willful conduct on Mr. Arthur's part, and therefore the district court
abused its discretion when it failed to consider whether lesser sanctions were adequate
to address Mr. Arthur's single violation.
There are generally two questions that must be determined by the district court in
addressing allegations of probation violations: first, the court must determine whether
the defendant actually violated the terms and conditions of his probation; and second, if
a violation of probation has been found, the trial court must then decide the appropriate
remedy for the violation.

State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009).

'The

determination of whether a probation violation has been established is separate from
the decision of what consequence, if any, to impose for the violation." Id. (quoting State

v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 799 (2004)). The trial court's decision to revoke probation
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and execute a defendant's underlying sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless
an abuse of discretion is shown. Id.
However, while the district court generally has broad discretion in making the
determination whether to revoke a defendant's probation, that discretion is curtailed if
the alleged probation violation has not been shown to have been willful on the
defendant's part. Where a violation of the terms of probation was not willful on the part
of the defendant, or was due to circumstances outside of the defendant's control, the
district court may not revoke probation without first considering whether there were any
adequate alternative methods to address the violation.

Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106

(quoting State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct App. 2001 )).
At the probation violation disposition hearing in this case, Mr. Arthur informed the
district court that, upon being incarcerated the same day as he was unable to provide a
urine sample for drug testing at the Lighthouse facility, he had actually requested that
the jail take blood and urine samples from him for purposes of testing. (11/22/10 Tr.,
p.32, Ls.17-25.) While he tried to contact his probation officer in order to have these
samples tested, his probation officer did not respond to his efforts. (11/22/10 Tr., p.32,
Ls.17-25.)
Additionally, Mr. Arthur explained that his difficulties in providing the urine sample
for testing, which was his reason for discharge from the New Life Program, were largely
attributable to a condition known as a "shy bladder."

(11/22/10 Tr., p.33, Ls.7-25.)

Because of his condition, the situational pressures of the manner in which his urine
sample was to be taken rendered him unable to provide the sample at that time.
(11/22/10 Tr., p.33, Ls.7-25.) Mr. Arthur further noted that there was no evidence at all
that he had actually relapsed or used alcohol. (11/22/10 Tr., p.34, Ls.7-12.)
10

Other issues that Mr. Arthur encountered with the New Life Program flowed from
conflicts in the religious ideology underpinning this program and the traditional Native
American heritage.

(11/22/10 Tr., p.35, Ls.7-23.)

Mr. Arthur's father and family

members are active practitioners of traditional Native American practices, including
participation in sweat lodges, and there were insinuations raised during the programs
that Mr. Arthur was participating in that his close family members "worshipped false
idols." (11/22/10 Tr., p.35, Ls.7-12.)

Ultimately, and to Mr. Arthur's credit, he made

successful efforts to both stand up for his personal heritage and to bring this conflict to a
positive resolution. (11/22/10 Tr., p.35, Ls.18-24.) Mr. Arthur's act of standing up for
his ethnic and religious heritage was not any act of willful resistance to his rehabilitative
process, nor should it have been deemed to be such by either the district court or those
charged with his therapeutic programming.
Mr. Arthur's single violation was not demonstrated to have been the result of
willful actions on his part.

The district court in this case was therefore required to

consider whether there were adequate alternative means to address this violation short
of revocation of probation that would sufficiently address this violation. The district court
did not do so.

The record also reflects that there were such adequate alternative

means, as both Mr. Arthur and the State advocated for a period of retained jurisdiction
as the proper remedy for the violation.

In light of this, the district court abused its

discretion when it revoked Mr. Arthur's probation and ordered his original sentence into
execution.
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111.

The District Court Abuse Its Discretion In Denying Mr. Arthur's Timely Rule 35 Motion
Seeking A Reduction Of His Sentence Following The Revocation Of His Probation
Because The District Court Failed To Recognize Its Discretion To Entertain The Merits
Of This Motion
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 permits a district court, upon revoking a defendant's
probation, to reduce the defendant's underlying sentence upon revocation, either sua
sponte or upon the defendant's motion. See, e.g., State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670,672
(Ct. App. 1998). The decision whether to grant a reduction of the defendant's sentence
pursuant to this rule is a matter of the trial court's discretion.

State v. Hanson, 150

Idaho 729, 249 P .3d 1184, 1188 (Ct. App. 2011 ). This Court reviews a district court's
discretionary determination for whether: (1) the district court correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion, (2) whether the court acted within the bounds of that
discretion and consistently with any legal standards that apply to the court's
determination, and (3) whether the court reached its decision through an exercise of
reason. See, e.g., State v. Anderson,_ Idaho_, 2011 WL 3793139 2 , *1. Where
the district court fails to recognize its discretion to take action in a particular case, an
abuse of discretion is shown and reversal is required. Id.
The district court in this case failed to recognize its discretion in ruling on
Mr. Arthur's Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction of his sentence, and failed to act in
accordance with reason, when the court erroneously ruled that Mr. Arthur was barred
from seeking relief under Rule 35 under the Idaho Court of Appeals' decision in State v.
Wade, 125 Idaho 522 (Ct. App. 1994 ).

2

As of the writing of this Appellant's Brief, the Court of Appeals' decision in State v.
Anderson has not yet been released for publication in the permanent law reports, and
therefore is subject to revision or withdrawal.
12

In Wade, the defendant filed a Rule 35 motion after the district court imposed the
exact sentence that both the defendant and the State had bargained for in the binding
Rule 11 (d)(1 )(C) agreement. Wade, 125 Idaho at 525. In this case, the Wade Court
noted that the defendant's claim was specifically that the defendant's sentence was
unreasonable when it was originally imposed.

Id.

Because the nature of the

defendant's challenge, along with his stipulation as to the appropriate sentence under
the binding plea agreement, the Wade Court held the defendant's motion was frivolous.
But the Wade Court noted that there may have been an abuse of discretion had
the defendant presented new and additional information that would have justified a
reduction of the defendant's sentence. Id. (noting that, "if there is any colorable merit to
Wade's motion, it must arise from new or additional information that would create a
basis for reduction of sentence."). Given this, even when the defendant is seeking a
reduction of sentence from the original sentencing disposition under Rule 35, the fact
that a defendant entered into a binding Rule 11 plea agreement does not deprive the
district court of discretion to act on the motion seeking a reduction of that sentence.
Contrary to the district court's-finding, entering into a binding plea agreement with
regard to sentencing does not deprive the defendant of the right to subsequently seek a
reduction of that sentence in light of new and additional information.

Nor does the

district court lack jurisdiction to entertain the merits of such a motion. This conclusion is
particularly strengthened in light of the nature of the district court's sentencing review
and determinations upon the revocation of probation.
"The duty of the trial court to provide an individualized sentence requires that the
court have access to the broadest possible range of information about the defendant."
State v. Howry, 127 Idaho 94, 95,896 P.2d 1002, 1004 (Ct. App. 1995). And this duty
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does is not limited to the initial sentencing of criminal defendants, as sentencing
determinations may also be revisited in those cases where a defendant has been
placed on probation, but subsequently violates the terms and conditions of his or her
release. At the disposition of a probation violation, the district court is not left solely with
the options of reinstating or revoking probation. Rather, the court possesses inherent
authority to re-examine the defendant's underlying sentence and to reduce that
sentence in light of mitigating evidence. See, e.g., State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397,
400 (Ct. App. 2008).
In fact, a reduction of the defendant's sentence may often be warranted given
that the district court may have initially articulated a lengthy underlying sentence as an
incentive for the defendant to comply with the strictures of his or her probation. The
policies for such initial sentencing determinations were articulated by the Idaho Court of
Appeals in State v. Jones:
It is a common practice for a trial court to impose a rather severe
underlying sentence as an incentive for the defendant to perform well in
the retained jurisdiction program and to comply with probation terms if the
defendant is placed on probation. A lengthy underlying sentence also
preserves the judge's options until such time as probation may be denied
or revoked, when the court can decide whether the sentence should be
reduced. A long underlying sentence thus provides the judge a hedge
against the uncertainty of the defendant's future performance.
State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 676 (Ct. App. 2005).

Under these standards, and in light of the district court's duty to provide a
sentence which truly measures the culpability of the underlying offense and offender,
every piece of evidence that would inform the district court's sentencing determination
becomes critical to the underlying outcome of the proceedings. And the district court's
review of the record in probation disposition proceedings is plenary - the trial court can
and should make an examination of the entire record and all facts pertinent to its
14

sentencing determination, regardless of whether those facts arose before or after the
defendant was placed on probation. See State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 287 (Ct. App.
2010).
In light of this, it is entirely appropriate for a defendant to file a Rule 35 motion
seeking a reduction of his sentence upon the revocation of probation, even where the
defendant entered into a binding Rule 11 plea agreement at the time of of the
defendant's original sentencing. The district court never found that Mr. Arthur failed to
submit new and additional information, arising after the time of sentencing, that would
have justified a reduction of his sentence. The court merely found that Mr. Arthur was
precluded from making this request in the first place. Because the district court failed to
recognize Mr. Arthur's legal right to seek a reduction of his sentence upon the
revocation of his probation, and likewise failed to recognize its own discretion to
entertain the merits of this motion, the district court abused its discretion in denying
Mr. Arthur's Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction of his sentence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Arthur respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
revoking his probation and ordering his original sentence into execution, and remand
this case for further proceedings. In the alternative, he asks that this Court reverse the
district court's order denying his Rule 35 motion seeking a reduction of his sentence and
remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of October, 2011.

SA AH E. TOM
S
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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